THEOLOGY

VOL. XLIX JUNE, 1946 No. 312

Editorial

THE hope of the Committees of Convocation, which issued *Confirmation To-day*, that their proposals would be widely and seriously considered is being met. The comments that have appeared in our own pages have covered many aspects of the subject and have indicated from how many standpoints it is approached and how diverse are the opinions that are at present held. It was coming to look as though the possibility of an agreed policy was remote. At first sight, the publication of Dom Gregory Dix's lecture on *The Theology of Confirmation in Relation to Baptism* (Dacre Press, 2s.) may seem to darken the prospect still further. As he justly observes, what he says "may appear to cut across much of the discussion rather than to contribute to it." All who have contributed to it are likely to feel that they must think again in the light of Dom Gregory's historical survey and to wish that they had been able to read his lecture before committing themselves to definite conclusions.

His disclosures are of a kind to embarrass the adherents of every theological school and the proponents of every practical policy. It is evident that the whole subject of Christian initiation requires deeper investigation than it has yet received in any quarter. We trust that some of our younger theologians are bending their minds to it, for until a great deal of hard theological work has been done it would be premature for the Church to launch out into practical changes. In one respect Dom Gregory is reassuring to Anglicans. He thinks very little change is needed in our practice, though a great deal of change is needed in our teaching. We hope therefore that when the Committees of Convocation report again they will devote much more space to the theology of baptism and confirmation. If the main lines of this could be clearly adumbrated, much needed help would be afforded to parish priests and others who are responsible for regular teaching.

We sympathize with one of them who writes to us: "The correspondence about baptism and confirmation is appalling to an unfortunate parish priest who has to teach . . . what?" But we think every reader of Dom Gregory's lecture will see that there cannot yet be any closing down of the discussion and that in the end the whole Church will gain immeasurably from a recovery of the biblical and patristic doctrine of Christian initiation.

Natural Law in the Bible—II

THERE are two other important passages in the Pauline epistles upon knowledge of God and of His Law outside the pale of the historical

revelation, the well-known passages in Rom. i, 19-21, ii, 14-15; but I postpone the consideration of these for the present, in order to ask whether the Petrine and Pauline valuation of the *communis sensus hominum*—which both of them, after all, might well have derived from popular Stoicism—has any support in the Gospels.

The evidence here is likely to be less direct and unequivocal, because Jesus was not, apart from two or three exceptional cases, in immediate touch with Gentile life and thought. He addressed Himself to "the lost sheep of the house of Israel"—those who, brought up in the knowledge of God's revealed Law, had in some measure outlawed themselves but might be assumed to be still influenced by its judgments. Undoubtedly much of His teaching presupposes the religious tradition of the Old Testament and would have cogency for those who acknowledged it. Where He gives fresh teaching, it is often explicitly related, even if by way of alteration, or even abrogation, to precepts of the ancient Law. But this reference to the Mosaic Law is not always even implicit. "Why do you not," He asks, "judge the right from yourselves?" (Luke xii, 57)—ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν—which might mean, either "from your own conduct in given circumstances" or "from your own accepted standards." The example given is that of a defendant who has a bad case, and who will make haste to come to terms with his opponent. There does not seem to be any allusion here to the revealed law. It is an appeal to the *communis sensus*. So is the ironical passage in Luke xiv, 8-10, which contrasts two guests, one of whom puts himself forward into the seat of honour, only to "lose face" by being requested to move, while the other takes the lowest place until invited to "come up higher." This illustration is used to enforce the maxim, "He that humbleth himself shall be exalted, but he that exalteth himself shall be abased." Similarly, the parables of the Two Sons, of the Unmerciful Servant and of the Two Debtors, and possibly others, assume certain standards of judgment among men, which are true in themselves and capable of being extended into higher regions of truth. In other parables such accepted human standards are actually used to support teaching about the character of God, such as those of the Lost Sheep and the Prodigal Son. Sometimes the transition from the human to the divine is made by an *a fortiori* argument: "If ye being evil know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more your Father in heaven?" (Matt. vii, 11). The rule of parental care is a universal element in a normal human outlook on life; and it has value and significance upon the highest levels.

Such fundamental laws of life are involved in God's creation of man. There is one passage which makes this clear—viz., the passage about marriage and divorce in Mark x, 1-9 (Matt. xix, 1-9). Moses permitted divorce as a concession. This was due only to man's obtuseness—διὰ τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν. But "from the beginning of creation" a different law prevailed: man and wife are "one flesh"; hence follows the principle of the indissolubility of marriage. It might be argued that the principle is enunciated as a deduction from the revealed Law, since the words "the two shall be one flesh" are in fact to be found in the Torah, but the intention seems to be to base the maxim on the *fact* recorded in

Genesis—"male and female created He them." And here it is profitable to note the teaching of some Jewish rabbis that certain fundamental laws were given to Adam in the act of creation, and among them the prohibition of adultery (see Strack-Billerbeck on Rom. ii, 14). The method by which this maxim was discovered in Genesis is highly artificial and very different from that employed by Jesus; but the implication here too seems to be that creation itself involves certain moral principles which are binding upon the creature. It is true that the doctrine of the Adamic precepts is not apparently attributed to any rabbi earlier than R. Jehuda I, who died *c.* 217 A.D., and is probably a development from an apparently earlier doctrine to which I shall presently allude. Nevertheless, although the precise formulation of the Adamic commands may be late, the readiness to acknowledge a primeval law given in creation may well have been there in earlier Judaism. Accepting this provisionally, we may, without the risk of anachronism, allow the interpretation of Mark x, 1-9 which finds in it the affirmation of a moral law implicit in the manner of man's creation at the hands of God. In view of this we seem justified in giving full weight to the impression which is derived from reflection on a whole class of parables—viz., that the structure of human relations upon the "natural" level, relations such as that of parent and child, master and servant, king and subject, friend and friend, disclose, upon examination, certain basic laws or maxims which are the mirror of the Creator's pattern for human life.

Another passage seems to invite us to go farther, and to say that not only the creation of man, but the order of created nature itself holds within it principles of morality. I refer to the famous passage in the Sermon on the Mount which, as given by Matthew (v, 44-48), grounds the maxim "Love your enemies" upon the *imitatio Dei*, and finds the imitable principle of the divine action in the observed order of creation: "He makes His sun to rise on evil and good, and rains on just and unjust." A glance at Wettstein's commentary on this passage will show that it closely resembles what may fairly be called a Stoic commonplace. Out of his collection of examples from pagan authors I will quote only Seneca, *De Benef.* iv. 26: *Si deos imitaris, da et ingratis beneficia: nam et sceleratis sol oritur, et piratis patent maria.* There is of course a wide difference of ethos between such sayings and those of the Sermon on the Mount, in that a Stoic could scarcely speak of "the gods" without having his tongue more or less in his cheek: all he really meant was the given structure of the material universe; whereas Jesus took with the utmost seriousness the reference of it all to the benevolence of the heavenly Father. It remains, however, that His sayings imply an order of creation containing within it the fundamental traits of God's design for human conduct.

This view is not without antecedents in the Old Testament. It is true that for the most part the writers of the Old Testament have their eye narrowly upon the history and destiny of the Chosen People. There are, however, portions of it which look beyond. Notably the book of Job discusses God's dealing with men on presuppositions which seem to be deliberately made broadly human rather than specifically

Israelite. The action of the drama is placed outside the land of Israel; Job and his friends appear to be of Edomite or kindred stock; the glory of God is set forth in terms of Creation without any reference to the history of the Chosen People or to their Law. Job, while it has close affinities to the Wisdom books, hardly lies upon the main line of the Old Testament scriptures. Yet here and there in the prophets too we have suggestions of a law embodied in creation to which man ought to give heed. "The stork in the heavens knoweth her appointed times," says Jeremiah (viii, 7), "and the turtle-dove, the swallow and the crane observe the time of their coming; but my people doth not know the ordinances of the Lord." And Isaiah (i, 3): "The ox knoweth his owner and the ass his master's crib; Israel doth not know, my people doth not consider." In such cases, however, it is Israel and not man in general who ought to be guided by knowledge of God and His ordinances as surely as the creatures are guided by their God-implanted instincts; and this accords with the general standpoint of the prophets.

But it is important to observe that the Old Testament places the whole history of Israel within a setting which is universal. God's dealings with the Chosen Race may be said to begin with the covenant with Abraham. But there was a more ancient covenant. After the deluge had obliterated the first creation, when the ancestors of the entire human race came out into a world reborn, "God spake unto Noah and to his sons with him and said, And I, behold, I establish my covenant with you and with your seed after you, and with every living creature that is with you, the fowl, the cattle and every beast of the earth with you."

This passage, whatever its precise date, was written by an author for whom God's covenant with Israel was a regulative fact of history and an assured *datum* for thought. The pattern of this covenant reappears in the report of the covenant with Noah: the divine act of deliverance is proclaimed, and the obligations of the covenant declared. The writer, then, was quite deliberate in emphasizing, all through, the complete universality of the primeval covenant—all mankind, every living creature, the earth itself are parties to it (Gen. ix, 8-17).[1] It follows that the patriarchal and Mosaic covenant was made with men who were already in covenant with God; that there is, strictly speaking, no man who is without the law (ἄνομος), unless by his own act, since all men inherit the covenant established with Noah and his seed.

Under the terms of the Noachian covenant, God offers to men a guarantee of stability in the order of creation—what science calls, or did call until recently, the "uniformity of nature" (Gen. ix, 11, *cf.* viii, 22). In turn He lays upon him certain injunctions and prohibitions. Man is to "replenish the earth"; he is to refrain from manslaughter and from eating the flesh of animals with the blood (Gen. ix, 1-7).[2]

[1] This is the covenant under which the stork in the heavens knoweth her appointed times.

[2] The contents of the Noachian Code are developed by the rabbis out of very scanty hints in Scripture, and it must be confessed that they are disappointingly inadequate as an attempt to state the Law of Nature. But the recognition that there is such a law

These hints of a primeval law belonging to a primeval covenant were elaborated by the Jewish rabbis into the so-called Noachian precepts, which constituted the *derek 'eretz*, the "way of all the earth," and were obligatory upon Gentiles. The list of sins prohibited varies a little, but it always, I think, includes idolatry, murder and adultery, and the eating of the flesh with the blood (Strack-Billerbeck on Rom. ii, 14). The earliest rabbi, so far as I know, who is recorded to have spoken of the Noachian code is Chanina ben Gamliel, *c.* 120 A.D. Chanina already assumes the existence of such a code, and only discusses details of its contents. We may therefore fairly assume that the idea existed in the first century. It seems likely, as many commentators hold, that the minimum requirements demanded of Gentile Christians in the Apostolic decree of Acts xv, 29 represent the Noachian code, which in that case must have been pre-Christian. Indeed, its very wide attestation in all kinds of rabbinic sources—Talmud and Midrash alike—suggests a very early origin. This doctrine of the Noachian precepts is the Jewish equivalent for the Stoic doctrine of the Law of Nature.[1]

All this, then, was part of the accepted background of the writers of the New Testament, and we are assured that in discovering hints of a universal or natural law in the Gospels and Epistles we are not importing an alien element into their thought.

We now come to the two passages which are the *loci classici* of the New Testament doctrine of the natural law—Rom. i, 19-21, ii, 14-15. The former of these states that the Gentiles, though outside the scope of the special revelation to Israel, are able to know God, whose invisible attributes are discerned by ratiocination (*νόησις*) from His works in creation. In fact, the pagans knew God, but did not *choose* to retain such knowledge; and hence their faculty for discerning Him was frustrated: their reason itself was degraded from its high office (i, 28). The second passage affirms that the Gentiles who are without the law nevertheless exhibit the effect of the law written in their hearts, whereto their conscience bears witness through their reasonings. Thus it is by nature (*φύσει*) that the virtuous pagan acts in accordance with God's law.

Upon the question whether this aboriginal capacity to know God is actually operative, or whether it has been lost through disobedience, the two passages appear to speak somewhat ambiguously, but they are not irreconcilable. It is necessary to bear in mind the purpose of the writer in each place. In chap. i Paul is addressing Gentiles, in chap. ii Jews; in both cases with the object of establishing their responsibility before God. So to the Jew he says, "It is not the hearer of the Law, but the doer who is justified, and so a good pagan is better than a bad Jew." To the Gentile he says, "Look at the state

justifies us in giving full weight to passages of the Old Testament which imply moral judgments not based directly upon the Mosaic covenant—*e.g.*, Amos i-ii, where foreign peoples are condemned for actions repugnant to common humanity.

[1] The doctrine of the Adamic precepts appears to be an attempt to push back the beginnings of the Law of Nature to the Creation itself. Their content differs little from that of the Noachian precepts.

of pagan society, and remember that this is the work of men who, knowing God, did not choose to worship Him." In so far as the νοῦς is ἀδόκιμος it is not due to original incapacity to know God, but to wrong moral choices; in so far as men do right by the light of nature, it is due to an original knowledge of God. In either case man's responsibility rests upon a knowledge of God and His will, which is not dependent on acquaintance with either Judaism or Christianity. Paul's argument does not require him to prove either, in the one case, that the νοῦς of pagan humanity is in fact *universally* ἀδόκιμος or, in the other case, that the pagan conscience *universally* attests the law written on the heart; but I think the argument *does* require that there is sufficient knowledge of God available to ensure man's responsibility, and that there is sufficient practice of the Law of God among pagans to shame the bad Jew.

In the second of these passages there is a remarkable phrase, "written on the hearts" γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις. In Jer. xxxi this is an attribute of the New Covenant, and that passage is echoed in Paul's *locus classicus* about the two covenants, 2 Cor. iii, 3. Is this accidental? Or does it mean that, just as Paul, in Gal. iii, 15-22, regards the Law of Moses from one point of view as a parenthesis between the covenant with Abraham and its fulfilment in Christ, so from another point of view it is a parenthesis between the original, Noachian covenant and its fulfilment in Christ? We have observed that in at least two cases the sayings of our Lord imply an appeal behind the Law of Moses to the order of creation. While, therefore, the Law of Moses is from one aspect the first stage of revelation, leading up to the Law of Christ, in another aspect it is a temporary expedient on the way from the Law of Nature to the Law of Christ, serving certain limited purposes, which fulfilled, it may be set aside, leaving mankind in Christ confronted by the original law of his creation.

Some such view seems to be implied in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. We have first to observe that in the Old Testament the term "law" (Torah) has for a constant synonym "the Word of the Lord." The evangelist indicates that he reserves the term νόμος for the Law of Moses, using the term "the Word" in a larger sense. The Law, or word of the Lord, according to various passages in the Old Testament, has as its outstanding attributes *chesed* and *'emeth*, rendered "mercy" or "grace," and "truth"—inaccurately, but sufficiently for our purpose. Taking up these terms, the evangelist says the Law was given by Moses, but the "grace" and "truth" which are the primary attributes of the Word of God came not by the Law but by Jesus Christ (i. 17). It is the revelation of the Word whose course we are invited to trace in the Prologue. First it was by the Word that the world was created. "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made," says the Old Testament. Later the Word was equated with Wisdom, and Wisdom in turn with Torah. This final equation the evangelist sets aside, retaining the Word, with many traits of Wisdom, as the creative power.

Next, the life thus brought into being became the light of man—the light "that lighteneth *every* man that cometh into the world".[1] The Word

[1] This I believe to be the correct construction of the sentence.

as light was in the whole world, yet unacknowledged (*cf.* Rom. i, 19-21); the Word as light came to Israel and was rejected (*cf.* Rom. ii). To those, however, who accepted it, it gave the right to be children of God—such as faithful Israelites (Hosea i, 10), and Gentiles who do by nature the things of the law (Rom. ii, 14-15). And so, finally, the Word became flesh. In Christ, therefore, man is confronted with that Word, Wisdom or Law which is the law of his creation, the same which was partially disclosed to Israel in the Torah, and is known in some measure to all mankind, through conscience and reason, as the Law of Nature.

C. H. Dodd.

The Early Essays of T. H. Green

Among the ultimate ideological factors accounting for the present ascendancy of moderate middle-class Socialism and the virtual extinction of the Liberal Party are the character, teaching and example of Thomas Hill Green (1836-82)—metaphysician, theologian, political theorist and moralist, educational reformer, progressive Radical, city councillor and university teacher. Probably the present generation of under-forties has no idea of how great a man this Balliol don was—both in the estimate of those who knew him in the flesh and of those who carried his ideas into their careers of service to Church and State and Commonwealth. His was in truth a seminal mind, and the harvest has been plenteous. In him were focused those new tendencies, philosophical, political, social, economic, which in the end destroyed the old capitalistic and philanthropic individualism. It would be hard to say whether the impulse of his teaching and example affected most the civil or the religious sphere of the national life. Tributes and testimonials from statesmen of the first rank, from Morley and Asquith to the late Lord Tweedsmuir and the present Viscount Halifax, occur frequently in the biographies and memoirs of the last half-century. Nonconformist divines like Hugh Price Hughes caught from Green the glow of a spiritualized sociology. The magnitude of his influence on the National Church through such intermediaries as Scott Holland, Illingworth, Gore, and William Temple is familiar to every casual reader of their works. In short, T. H. Green, in a brief working life of some twenty years, revivified British philosophy, re-orientated Anglican theology, and carried through the first stages of the construction of a new theory of state and community. To add that he was a persistent and powerful pioneer of educational advance at all levels, an ardent municipal reformer, a convinced and open temperance crusader, a founder of the settlement movement and a successful administrator of the finances and domestic economy of his college, is still not to have said enough. For we have still to add that Green was a good man and full of the Holy Ghost. If, according to current usage, we must call him a Protestant, then, as Mill was "the saint of Rationalism," so Green was the saint of Liberal Protestantism.

It is perhaps time—though the publishers are busy—for someone to take in hand a fresh study of Green—which will, however, require a

writer skilled in metaphysics, ethics, theology and political science. Here is offered by way of an *aperçu* into a large room no more than a note on the firstfruits of his intellectual awakening. After two years of comparative indolence at Balliol (resulting in a second class in Moderations) Green began a new chapter. Two years later (1859) he had, under Jowett's prodding, redeemed time misspent and taken a first in *Literæ Humaniores*. In 1860 he realized a youthful dream in his election to a fellowship.

The two short essays which open the third volume of Green's collected *Works* are his earliest printed remains. "The Force of Circumstances" originally appeared in a collection of "Undergraduate Papers," Oxford, 1858; "The Influence of Civilization on Genius" was also written about the same time. There were earlier essays, one of them an unsuccessful attempt at the Ellerton Theological Prize, mentioned by the editor but not printed. These first two pieces must serve to exhibit Green's treatment of themes which were to occupy the strength of his maturity. Here, as the editor rightly says, we can discover certain leading ideas, formed by the age of twenty-four and "never really abandoned." Here are all the heads of the many discourses which were to follow: the primacy of reason, the creative power of mind, the paramountcy of the idea, the underlying unity of the universe and of man's knowledge thereof, the progressive and parallel advance of public intelligence and social institutions as "the divine idea of the world" realizes and manifests itself in states, churches and other associations, eternal life as a present reality, and so on. That is not to say that at twenty-four Green had satisfied himself with formulæ; as every student of the over-loaded pages of the posthumous *Prolegomena to Ethics* knows, he had at forty-four explored further ranges and plumbed deeper depths, and had become conscious of complexities and difficulties unapparent to the undergraduate. There is less assurance and greater caution and labouring of detail as the weight of learning and thought increases with the passing years. All that is claimed is that Green held the keys in his hand with which in due course he could open the doors to various wings of the house of man's moral being and the mansions of God's eternity. For it is here assumed (what to prove would involve long argument) that Green and his colleagues and successors of the Oxford idealist school did in fact map and chart territory in the realms of philosophy, ethics and politics which are and will remain *terræ cognitæ* to the end of time. In these earliest of his printed remains we are at the springs of what were to become rivers flowing deep and wide.

Green himself at Oxford (and that place, the city and the university, was his home to the end of his all too brief career) exemplied as teacher and citizen a dictum which is the keynote of the first of our two papers. "The spiritual energy of the liberated few introduces an element of good into the forces to which the many are subject." We may combine the argument of the two essays into the thesis that the man of genius is isolated in his own lifetime, since men are for the most part the slaves of their own passions or of the debasing influence of

"society," but that in some future age he becomes the master-mind of a nation which has at length in some mysterious way reached a level where his teaching is recognized as "that after which they have been striving." The world at length finds light in the darkness and the solitary thinker whose "genius" (*i.e.*, faith or moral insight) raised him superior to the force of private circumstances, or the debilitating sickness of a commercial and materialistic civilization, at length comes into his own. Fresh springs of moral life are opened by those, "the liberated few," who were in the world but not of it.

In 1862 Green won the Chancellor's English Essay Prize with a dissertation on "The Value and Influence of Works of Fiction." His success was a source of some amusement to the essayist, who frankly confessed his limitations in this region. It may be assumed that the success was due not to his familiarity with fiction but to an easy movement among ideas which gives the essay a distinct air of mastery and authority. We may select two points, one of interest to the professor of æsthetic, the other to the student of politics.

The essayist does not conceal his low opinion of novels and novel-readers. Fiction, he thinks, encourages shallowness, sentimentality, self-pity, irreverence and other moral weaknesses. Novels are and must be "a reflex of life"; they are therefore confined to the phenomenal and circumstantial; they cannot penetrate to the deeper consciousness nor evoke the spirit which triumphs over adversity and disaster. Fiction as an instrument of further education is by its very essence strictly limited. "Man is not really mere man, though he may think himself so," and to learn and apply the secret of the good life he must step outside himself. To fancy that "after a sojourn in the world of fiction" he will return braced for the struggle is futile; he has gained and assimilated no new understanding of the ideal world nor learned to turn "matter to spirit by sublimation strange." He has done nothing to reduce phenomena to a unity. He has not removed the limits of the mundane horizon. Only the great poets can do man that high service; they alone can deliver him from the wrong kind of self-consciousness and from dependence on external circumstances. Poetry is alone able to evoke that "energy of thought which simplifies the phenomena of life by referring them to a spiritual principle," and to assist that necessary passage from "the contradictory data of the common understanding to the unity of a deeper consciousness." Here is the young philosopher at the age-long task of reducing the multiplicity of fact to the unity of idea. In Green's submission that task is beyond the scope of the novelist, though not of the great epic and tragic poets.

However, as the essayist turns from metaphysician to political theorist or sociologist, the novelist and the novel-reader receive consolation prizes. For fiction can at least make some contribution towards furthering the progress of man-in-society. It cannot, like great poetry, open the prison doors but it may help to enlarge and to decorate the prison house of man's temporary sojourning. It may enable the prisoners to combine in improving the domestic economy. In plain words, the novelists can forward the improvement of mankind by

making man better understood by his fellow-man, by destroying the ignorance which injures social fellowship and sets nation against nation. "He who makes man better known to man takes the first step towards healing the wounds which man inflicts on man." Defoe and Fielding, Scott and Kingsley, uncover the sores of society and so appeal to that "public intelligence" which can override the selfishness of individuals and classes. Novels may do something to prevent "the ossification of society" and the despotism of the present ordering of human affairs. Social and economic exploitation arises more often from ignorance than from malice, from acquiescence than deliberate selfishness, and the deadweight of fixed ideas and social habits and class conventions is lessened when the novelist brings them plainly to the light. Walter Scott, "a Tory of the purest water," thus became a reformer of abuses and taught the English gentry the basic principle of social democracy: the equality, irrespective of the accessories of fortune, of each human soul. Despite his low opinion of the novel-reader, Green in the end decides that the novel has its place "as the great reformer and leveller of our time." "The work of the reformer progresses as the social force is brought to bear more and more fully on classes and individuals, merging distinctions of privilege and position in one social organism."

"One social organism"—there we have it. Those whose business it is to plot the movement of British political thought in recent decades will observe that by 1862 T. H. Green, *via* a dissertation more or less acute on novels and novel-reading, has found his way to the keyword of his later and weightier deliverances on the basis of political obligation: the State is not atomic but organic, not a sandheap nor an ant-heap, but a living organism whose multitudinous members are free spirits making the best and most of themselves in the service of the whole.

Not many of us would care to be judged by the essays of our undergraduate years: "Ripeness is all." Nor should we apply so absurd a test to Green. If we were so tempted we should have to add several essays and addresses printed in the *Miscellanies* belonging to the years when he was still beginning his career as a college and extra-mural lecturer. The four lectures on the Puritan Revolution, for instance, delivered at Edinburgh in his thirtieth year, have as their thesis an astonishing anticipation of the final conclusion reached by S. R. Gardiner after a lifetime's study of that period of English history. But the three essays we have briefly analysed are by themselves a portent. From the vantage point of eighty years after, they appear as signals run up to show the wind slowly veering to a new quarter. They are symbolic, if no more, of the emergence about 1865 of new factors and forces, philosophical and political, which have refashioned and are still refashioning the pattern of English life in politics, industry, education, religion, and general social habit.

W. G. Addison.

Cranmer and the Edwardine Prayer Books—I

The revived interest in liturgical studies has led not only to a careful examination of the principles and growth of the ancient liturgies of the Church, of which *The Shape of the Liturgy*, by Dom Gregory Dix, is the latest and most brilliant example. It has also led to a reconsideration of our own sixteenth-century rite and of its underlying theological and liturgical principles, which are identified, perhaps too hastily, with those of Archbishop Cranmer.

Cranmer, as is well known, established friendly relations with the Lutherans during his visit to Germany in the time of Henry VIII, and welcomed the followers of Bullinger, the successor of Zwingli at Zurich, in the reign of Edward VI. It has therefore been inferred that he became a Zwinglian in doctrine with regard to the sacraments.

What, then, was the doctrine of Zwingli on this subject? To him the sacraments were "signs or ceremonies by which a man *proves to the Church* that he is an initiate [*candidatus*] or soldier of Christ. They [the sacraments] render the whole Church rather than yourself certain of your faith. They have no power to liberate the conscience." That is to say, they are merely, in the words rejected by our 25th Article, "badges or tokens of Christian men's profession." Later on, however, he admitted that they were an "aid and help to faith."[1] With regard to the Eucharist, in our Lord's statement "This is my body" the word *is* is identical with *signifies*. The teaching in the sixth chapter of St John about eating the Bread of Life refers simply to believing the Gospel and has no reference to sacramental eating. (*Christus hoc capite per panem et edere nihil aliud quam evangelium et credere intelligit . . . et prorsus non loquitur de sacramentali esu.*) "Eating in the Eucharist does nothing else than make it plain to your brother that you are a member of Christ, and again it binds you to live the Christian life." Zwingli does, however, define this eating in the sacrament as believing that Christ's body was slain for us. (*Tunc editur corpus ejus cum pro nobis creditur csum.*) And in an attempted agreement with the Lutherans it was stated that "the spiritual enjoyment (*Niessung*) of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ is especially necessary." Yet the use of the sacrament was chiefly to stir the weak consciences to faith. And in his *Fidei Ratio*, published shortly before his death, Zwingli regards the Body of Christ as present by the contemplation of faith, which he explains as a mental recollection of the Passion and work of the Lord. (*Credo quod in Sacra Eucharistia . . . verum corpus Christi adsit, fidei contemplatione: hoc est quod ii . . . agnoscunt illum veram carnem adsumpsisse, et sic omnem rem per Christum gestam illis fidei contemplatione velut præsentem fieri.*)[2]

Further, it must be remembered that Zwingli consistently, with his refusal to regard any sacrament as a *means* of grace, declares that in Baptism "the dipping does not wash away sins; the baptized believes in the salvation of the gospel, that is, in the gracious redemption of Christ."[3]

[1] Ref. in Loofs, *Dogmengeschichte*, 801 ff.
[2] Kidd, *Documents of the Continental Reformation*, p. 474.
[3] Loofs, 797 (10).

The teaching of his master was slightly modified by Bullinger in so far as he allowed some participation in the life of Christ in the Eucharist through faith—*e.g.*, "I confess that spiritual, divine and quickening presence of our Lord Christ, both in the supper and out of the supper, whereby he continueth to pour himself into us, not by signs lacking life, but by his Holy Spirit," and speaks of the receiver truly participating his [Christ's] life through faith.[1]

Now it is well known that Cranmer's earlier views on the Eucharist had undergone a radical change by the time he wrote his *Defence of the True and Catholic Doctrine of the Sacrament* in 1550, and this change must be dated back to some time before the publication of the first Edwardine Prayer Book. That is shown by his statements on the Eucharist in the " Great Parliamentary Debate" on the Sacrament in the House of Lords in December 1548, when he was presumably under the influence of the Polish reformer à Lasco, whose views approximated to those of Bullinger and the Zurich school. But Cranmer declared at his trial that he owed his conversion on this subject to Ridley, who ascribed his own change of views to the reading of the ninth-century treatise of Ratramnus or Bertram, in which a figurative interpretation seemed to be given to the Eucharist. Ridley's own view was given at his defence in the Oxford Disputation of 1554, just before his death. In answer to the Marian examiner Weston, who said, "Ye say, Christ gave not His body, but a figure of His body," he replied, "I say not so; I say he gave His own body verily; but He gave it by a real, effectual and spiritual communication."[2]

At the above-mentioned Debate of 1548 he declared that Christ is present in the sacrament by His working, and elsewhere he says, "in the sacrament of the altar is the natural body and blood of Christ *vere et realiter*, indeed and really, for spiritually, by grace and efficacy.[3] Again, he makes it clear that the elements of bread and wine are changed by consecration, not indeed in substance, but by receiving a new virtue. He says, "Afterward they be sanctified and so do receive then another sort or kind of virtue, which they had not before."[4]

Cranmer himself based his own Eucharistic doctrine on that of Ridley, according to the statement of Sir John Cheke, who, in his preface to the 1557 edition of the *Defence*, writes: "This man, after much searching of the scriptures, by the instruction of one blessed martyr, Ridley, bishop of London, at long last (in the year '46 to be precise) was led into that opinion which he here defends."[5]

What, then, is the doctrine that can be gathered from the *Defence* and from Cranmer's subsequent *Answer* to Gardiner's *Reply*? In the first book of the *Defence*, when he was presumably under the influence of à Lasco, certain Zwinglian expressions are to be found—*e.g.*, "the true eating . . . of the said body . . . of Christ is with a constant and lively faith to believe that Christ gave his body . . . upon the cross for us, and that he doth so join and incorporate himself to us that he is

[1] *Fifth Decade*, Parker Soc., 452 and 434. [2] *Works*, Parker Soc., 234.
[3] *Ibid.*, 274. [4] Foxe, *Martyrs*, vi, 315.
[5] Quoted Smyth, *Cranmer and the Reformation under Edward VI*, 60.

our head and we his members."[1] And, in common with Calvin, he treats the sacraments (*i.e.*, Baptism and the Eucharist) as assurances of grace given rather than means by which grace is conveyed—*e.g.*, in the words, "another property . . . far passing the condition of common bread, that is to say that the bread doth *show unto us*,[2] as the same Cyprian saith, that we are partakers of the Spirit of God and most purely joined unto Christ."[3] And, like most of the Reformers, he regarded the sacraments as aids to faith. He can write, "the washing in water of baptism . . . is to the confirmation of the inward faith which we have in him."[4]

Furthermore, in common with the theologians of Zurich, he equated the sacraments of the Christian Church with those of the old law. From this it has been inferred[5] that as circumcision and the eating of the manna in the wilderness were purely symbolical and could denote nothing more than faith in the Christ who was not yet born, whose body was not yet existent, therefore Baptism and the Eucharist which correspond with them must be in Cranmer's mind of the same character.

To deal with the last point first, it must be remembered that Cranmer, like most of the theologians of his day, was a pure fundamentalist. He believed that Abraham and Moses and the pious Israelites generally had an explicit faith in the Christ that was to come, and that by circumcision the Jewish child was incorporated into the Church of God, which was as truly the Body of Christ as the Christian Church, its successor, and that in this rite of initiation sins were forgiven in virtue of the foreseen merits of Christ, just as truly as in Christian Baptism.

Again, the eating of the manna was a real participation in spiritual meat, and the drinking of the water from the rock a true spiritual drink, for St Paul had declared this (in 1 Cor. x, 4) and identified the rock with Christ Himself. The eating and drinking were beneficial only when accompanied by faith, but a real gift was given—namely, the grace which flowed (by anticipation) from the Redemption wrought by our Lord.[6]

As to the former statements that the sacraments of the Christian Church are assurances of grace given, and means of confirming our faith, it must be remembered that these assertions are not so much untrue as inadequate. As the Church Catechism teaches, the sacraments are pledges of grace received as well as means by which grace is given.

It has, however, been pointed out by Canon Smyth that these Zwinglian expressions occur mainly in the first book of the *Defence*, written when à Lasco was living at Lambeth, but that the other

[1] Cranmer, *Works*, ed. Jenkyns, ii, 306. [2] Italics mine. [3] Jenkyns, ii, 340.
[4] *Ibid.*, 303. [5] *E.g.*, by Dom Gregory Dix in *The Shape of the Liturgy*.
[6] Jenkyns, ii, 378, and iii, 112: "It was all but one Christ to them and to us, who gave life, comfort and strength to them by His death to come, and giveth the same to us by His death passed. As He was in their sacraments spiritually and effectually present, and for so much truly and really present, that is to say in deed before He was born, no less than He is now in our sacraments present—but as for carnal presence He was to them not yet come."

books were composed when Bucer, whose views approached much nearer to Catholicism, had arrived in England. Let us take some of the expressions found in these later books and in the *Answer* to Gardiner. Here we find definite statements to the effect that receiving the Eucharist is not identical with believing in the benefits wrought for us by our Lord's Passion, but is the actual reception of a gift, defined variously as spiritual nourishment, or "Christ's very flesh and blood." "The effect of his godly eating is the communication of Christ's body and blood"—and this effect is explicitly distinguished from the eating: "although the eating and drinking of Christ be here defined by the effect, for the very eating is the believing, yet wheresoever the eating is the effect must be also" (Jenkyns, iii, 82 and 65-66). A further definition of the gift is "Christ who giveth us spiritual and eternal life."

In the *Answer* he actually combats Zwinglian views, as for instance when he says, "that the bread doth only signify Christ's body absent, which thing I never said nor thought—my book [*i.e.*, the *Defence*] saith clean contrary, that Christ is with us spiritually present, is eaten and drunken of us and dwelleth within us."[1] "The use of the bread is not a bare token (but) a token that the body of Christ was broken and crucified for them, and to them spiritually and effectually given, and of them spiritually and fruitfully taken and eaten to their spiritual . . . comfort, sustentation and nourishment of their souls."[2]

Furthermore he repeatedly draws a parallel between Baptism and the Eucharist. Now in Baptism there can be no doubt that he believes that a real gift is imparted. In the *Defence*, speaking of Baptism, he writes: "Christ is verily present with us and . . . by him we be newly born again spiritually and washed from our sins and grafted in the stock of Christ's own body, and be apparelled, clothed and harnessed with him."[3] Again, there can be no question that the doctrine of regeneration together with the washing away of sin is explicitly taught in the Baptismal service of both the Edwardine prayer books, and there is no kind of reason to suppose that the doctrine embodied in that rite differs from that of their author.

In what ways, then, did Cranmer's Eucharistic doctrine differ from the Catholic one as taught for instance by St Thomas Aquinas?

First, he denies a corporal or carnal presence of Christ's body, because he believes with both Catholics and Protestants in that age that our Lord's natural body is in heaven regarded as a place and possesses the dimensions and other physical qualities of a human body. This leads him to deny that It can be on earth or anywhere else. In view of the Nominalist philosophy which he inherited from the late medieval schoolmen he cannot allow the existence of the substance of Christ's body apart from its accidents (or material qualities) and is therefore precluded from admitting such a presence in the Eucharist, a presence after the manner of a spirit. For this he substitutes with Calvin a virtual presence—*i.e.*, the presence of Christ in the receiver, as opposed to the bread and wine, by His grace, virtue or Spirit (though he emphatically denies that he means the Holy Spirit instead of the full

[1] Jenkyns, iii, 40. [2] P. 48. [3] *Ibid.*, ii, 302.

manhood of Christ.[1] The function of the Holy Spirit is that of "uniting him [Christ] and us together."[2]

Consequently, he denies the reception of Christ's body with the mouth, or the reception of It by the unworthy. He insists that our Lord can only be received by faith. In saying that faith is necessary if the reception of the Eucharist is going to incorporate the receiver into Christ and strengthen the union between Christ and the soul, Cranmer is entirely orthodox. It is only his denial of the identification of the consecrated Bread with the Lord's Body that is contrary to the received doctrine of the Church. He is perfectly right in condemning a carnal eating such as the Jews at Capernaum supposed in the teaching of our Lord in St John vi, and in insisting, as Article XXIX does, that "the wicked are in no wise partakers of Christ," if partaker means one who is united with Christ. But he tends to separate the outward sign from the inward reality to such an extent that, while Bucer speaks of Christ as present in the sacraments, Cranmer will only allow that our Lord is present in the administration of the sacraments. And, as Hooker did later on, he looks for the presence of Christ in the receiver rather than in the elements, and insists that such a presence is spiritual and not corporal.

He also insists on the value of what is generally known as Spiritual Communion—*i.e.*, communion apart from the reception of the Eucharist. "Faithful Christian people," he writes in the *Answer*, "continually from time to time record in their minds the beneficial death of our Saviour Christ, chewing it by faith in the cud of their spirit, and digesting it in their hearts, feeding and comforting themselves with that heavenly meat . . . and so they eat Christ's body spiritually, though not the sacrament thereof."[3] But, far from belittling sacramental communion, he adds: "But when such men for their more comfort and confirmation of eternal life, given unto them by Christ's death, come unto the Lord's holy table, then, as before they fed spiritually on Christ, so now they feed corporally also upon the sacramental bread. By which sacramental feeding in Christ's promises their former spiritual feeding is increased and they grow and wax continually more strong in Christ." "As for your [Gardiner's] Catholic confession that Christ doth indeed feed such as be regenerated in him, not only by his body and blood, but also with his body and blood at his holy table, this I confess also."[4]

Cranmer's views on the Sacrifice of the Mass are certainly unsatisfactory as judged by Catholic standards. But it is important to notice exactly what he affirms and what he denies. He admits the term sacrifice as applied to the Mass, but defines that sacrifice as "commemorative and gratulatory."[5] He denies that it is propitiatory, because that quality belongs to the Sacrifice of the Cross alone. Secondly, he insists that it is the sacrifice of priest and people alike, not of the priest for the people. Thirdly, he confines its benefits to those who actually partake of the sacrament.

Like Luther and the Reformers generally he fails to see that the

[1] Jenkyns, iii, 65. [2] *Ibid.*, iii, 233. [3] *Ibid.*, iii, 130.
[4] *Ibid.*, iii, 86. [5] *On the Lord's Supper*, Parker Soc., 359 and 369.

Eucharist is the means of applying the propitiation of the Cross to the sins of the individual and therefore in no sense derogates from the completeness and finality of the Sacrifice on Calvary. Again, he shares the practically universal view of his time that sacrifice (at any rate propitiatory sacrifice) involves bloodshedding and death. Consequently to regard the Eucharistic Sacrifice as propitiatory would involve the belief that Christ is slain afresh in every Mass (a view which finds a baneful reflection in some of the post-Tridentine explanations of the Mass by Roman Catholic theologians, as reducing our Lord to the "state of a victim" or to an "inferior state," etc.). Hence the fierce language in which he denounces "all popish priests that presume to make every day a sacrifice of Christ, either must they [he says] needs make Christ's sacrifice vain, imperfect and unsufficient, or else is their sacrifice in vain, which is added to the sacrifice which is already of itself sufficient and perfect."[1] (He is not surely attacking the Roman rite in itself, which he had used himself, and which, as he must have known, was used by his hero Ratramnus.)

He admits that the Eucharist is a commemoration of the sacrifice of the Cross, but unfortunately treats it as something to remind us, rather than to remind God,[2] possibly because such language would appear to him to be unduly anthropomorphic.

At one point, however, he realizes the heavenly priesthood of our Lord. "Christ ascended up into heaven . . . and before him [the Father] he maketh continual supplication for the sins of the whole world, presenting his own body, which was torn for us, and his precious blood, which he . . . shed for us upon the Cross."[3] This should have shown him that the finality of Calvary does not preclude the continual presentation in heaven of the sacrifice once offered on the Cross. And if it does not do so in heaven, neither does it preclude this presentation on the earthly altars of the Church. But unhappily few people at that time, either Catholic or Protestant, thought of identifying the Eucharistic action with that of our Lord in heaven, although it was plain to see in the mention of the heavenly altar (*sublime altare*) in the Latin Canon, to which our offerings are borne by the Angel of God, who is probably Christ Himself. They were probably unable to do this because of the local separation which they regarded as existing between earth and heaven.

H. Edward Symonds, C.R.

(*To be concluded.*)

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.—The Faculty of Divinity intend to appoint a University Lecturer to teach Hebrew and the Old Testament from October 1, 1946. Candidates are invited to write for particulars to the Secretary, the Faculty Board of Divinity, Clare College, Cambridge.—[Advt.]

---

[1] Jenkyns, ii, 452. [2] *Op. cit.*, Parker, 359. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 346.

Why You Should Read It—II

THE EUCHARISTIC DOCTRINE OF ROBERT ISAAC WILBERFORCE[1]

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY EUCHARIST. By Robert Isaac Wilberforce, A.M., Archdeacon of the East Riding. London: Mozley. Oxford: Parker. First edition 1853.

IT is appropriate that at the time of the centenary of the enthronement of Samuel Wilberforce as Bishop of Oxford some attempt should be made to rescue from oblivion the work of his less active but more studious brother Robert Isaac Wilberforce, a theologian who, in the middle of the last century, was discussing themes which are generally supposed to have been neglected altogether until their revival in the twentieth century by such writers as de la Taille, Vonier, Congar, Mersch and de Lubac. The main facts of his life are briefly told. Born in 1802, he became a fellow of Oriel in 1826 and remained in Oxford until 1831 as a colleague of Newman and Froude. After holding country livings, he became Archdeacon of the East Riding in 1841 and had long correspondence with Manning, whom in 1854 he followed into the Church of Rome. Just over two years later he died at Albano. In 1848 there was published his book on *The Doctrine of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ*, in which the modern discussions of the cosmic significance of the mediatorial work of the ascended Christ and of the Church as His Mystical Body are quite remarkably anticipated; it was followed in the next year by *The Doctrine of Holy Baptism*, written with explicit reference to the current controversy about regeneration; and in 1853 there appeared the book on the Holy Eucharist which is the subject of this article and which is probably Wilberforce's finest work.

It is typical of his time that he begins his discussion by considering the Eucharistic Presence rather than the Sacrifice, but he is quite clear that the Presence is not an end in itself. Thus, having disposed of the views of Calvin and Zwingli, he refuses as firmly to be satisfied with that of Luther. For, as he points out, Luther, while maintaining the *reality* of the Presence, denied its *efficacy*: "the Body of our Lord was not, as the Church had always supposed, a life-giving principle, which was actually communicated through the instrumentality of certain media; it was only intended to give greater *impressiveness* to the ordinance and its office terminated in the ordinance itself." Wilberforce plainly saw, as Dom Dix has seen more recently, that the true essence of sixteenth-century Protestantism lay in its doctrine of purely imputed justification and that everything else was secondary to that.

In his own exposition of the presence, Wilberforce clearly anticipates Dom Anscar Vonier. To Vonier it is essential that the presence is not merely *supernatural* but *sacramental*, produced by that quite unique mode of efficient causality in which the instrument is a divinely ordained *sign*:

[1] I have made considerable use, in preparing this article, of material in a forthcoming work entitled *Christ, the Christian and the Church*. I am indebted for permission to the courtesy of the publishers, Messrs Longmans, Green and Co.—E.L.M.

The sacramental world [writes Vonier] is a new world created by God, entirely different from the world of nature and even from the world of spirits. It would be bad theology to say that in the sacraments we have here on earth modes of spiritual realities which resemble the ways of the angels. We have nothing of the kind. If we spoke with the tongues of angels and men it would not help us in the least to express the sacramental realities. Sacraments are a new creation with entirely new laws.[1]

Similarly, Wilberforce makes three assertions about the Presence: it is *supernatural*, it is *sacramental*, it is *real*. On the second point he writes as follows:

The Subject and Predicate in our Lord's words of Institution were united together by a *sacramental identity*. For this was shown to imply that the Holy Eucharist consisted of two parts, a *sacramentum* and a *res sacramenti*—the first an object to the senses, the second an object only to faith and to the mind. And further, it was shown to be the purpose of consecration, to unite these two together, so that they might have that peculiar relation to one another which belongs to this sacrament.

This conception, he remarks, solves the problem of the spatial characteristics of the Presence:

It is a sacramental presence—the presence, that is, of a *res sacramenti*, which is not, in itself, an object to the senses of men. . . . There is a connection between the *sacramentum* and *res sacramenti*, and form and place belong to the first, though they do not belong to the second. So that though the *res sacramenti*, in itself, has neither place nor form, yet it has them in a manner through the *sacramentum*, with which it is united.

And, referring to the words of institution, he writes:

The word *is* expresses the *identity* of the Subject and Predicate. . . . But identity is of various kinds, and what is the nature of the identity here intended? . . . It is plainly a peculiar principle—*sui generis*; which, being without parallel in the world around, is entitled to a specific appellation. . . . The union can be described as nothing else than a *sacramental identity*.

Again, he says:

Our Lord does not speak of bread at large, or wine in general, but of *This*—*i.e.*, of that which was consecrated or set apart. . . . The consecration, therefore, by which these elements were separated from all co-ordinate specimens of the same material, is that circumstance which gives them the peculiar character which his words express.

And, contrasting the Eucharist with Baptism, he points out that "in one case the medium is an *act*, in the other an *element*." It will be clear how close he comes here to St Thomas's remark that "this sacrament is accomplished by the consecration of the matter, while the rest are perfected in the use of the consecrated matter,"[2] and to Sir William Spens's statement that in the Eucharist "our Lord instituted an effectual symbolism . . . of object, rather than directly of action."[3]

[1] *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, p. 35.
[2] *S. Theol.*, III, lxxviii, 1 *c.* [3] *Belief and Practice*, p. 167.

But it is in speaking of the effects of the sacrament that Wilberforce reaches his greatest heights of eloquence and understanding. It is not so much that we receive Christ as that Christ receives us:

When we speak of Christ, then, as giving his Body for our food, and of the building up of the Body of Christ as the consequence, it is obvious that the process is exactly the reverse of that which happens in the case of ordinary nourishment. Since it is *Christ's* body which is built up; in *him*, and not in *us* must be the informing Spirit. It must be the life which has its source in him, from which "all the Body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered, increaseth unto the increase of God." "My body lives by my spirit; yours by your spirit. The Body of Christ cannot live save by the Spirit of Christ."[1] So that though Christ's Body is orally received, yet *it* does not become part of *us*, but *we* become part of *him*; *he* is not resolved, as it were, into the structure of our minds, but *we* pass, on the contrary, into his divine organization. The *sacramentum* indeed, or outward part, is assimilated, like other food, to the body which receives it: but the *res sacramenti* is an energizing principle, which takes up and quickens that upon which it is bestowed.

And the Eucharist is far from being an action of individual Christians or a means of merely individual sanctification. It is the act of Christ, the Ascended Head of the Mystical Body, drawing the Body into His perpetual presentation of the Sacrifice of Calvary.

It may be seen [Wilberforce writes] on what principle, and in what degree, the *devotion* of Christians makes part of the sacrifice of the Holy Eucharist. . . . Considered in itself, it does not answer to those conditions which are to be looked for in the Eucharistic Sacrifice. For there is nothing sacramental in its character; there is no *sacramentum* or *res sacramenti*; the prayers which are offered at the Holy Communion do not differ from those which accompany any other act of worship. But there is one view in which the worshippers may be regarded, which connects them with that which has been shown to be the true oblation in the Holy Eucharist; and this circumstance it is which enables themselves to "present themselves, their souls and bodies, a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice." For "the Christian Sacrifice," says St Augustine, is "the many who make up one body in Christ." So that "the whole congregation and society of the saints is offered to God as an universal sacrifice by its great High Priest, who also offered up himself in his Passion for us, that we might be the Body of so great a Head." On this principle did the Apostle speak of the oblation, of which he was the minister, as "the offering up of the Gentiles"; inasmuch as in this sense the Christian Church itself constitutes the sacrifice which is presented to God. Thus it is in some sort the *res sacramenti*, which is aptly symbolized by the many grains, which have been kneaded together into its outward part or earthly emblem. For "we being many, are one bread and one body." So that, regarded in this manner in its collective character, the Christian Church fulfils the conditions of a sacramental offering. But nothing can show more clearly than this very circumstance, that the true *res sacramenti*, Christ's Body in its Real Presence, is not excluded from the sacrifice. . . . For is it not the perfection of his Body natural, by which his Body mystical is sanctified? . . . If the Body mystical therefore of Christ be a fit sacrifice to offer to God, it is by reason of the influence and presence of that Body natural by which it is ennobled. So that when she is herself offered up "a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God," we may not exclude that, by which alone this is rendered a grateful sacrifice to the Father. The Church, which

[1] The quotation is from Augustine, *In Joan.*, Trac. xxvi, 13.

is the mystical Body of Christ, is accepted through the perpetual pleading of his Body natural. . . .

The Eucharistic Sacrifice . . . is the offering up of the collective Church, Christ's mystical Body, but it is also the offering up of Christ himself, by whom that Body is sanctified. . . . He who has been consecrated a Priest for ever after the order of Melchisedek, chooses this medium for giving effect to his perpetual intercession. That acceptance which he purchased by the sacrifice of the cross, he applies through the sacrifice of the altar. He himself it is, who through the voice of his ministers consecrates these earthly gifts, and thus bestows the mystery of his Real Presence. By himself, again, is the precious Victim presented before the Father's throne; and the intervention of their Heavenly Head gives reality to the actions of his earthly ministers.

What, then, is the source of this high Eucharistic doctrine? It is almost entirely patristic, and it is impossible for the reader not to be struck by the determination with which Wilberforce appeals to the Fathers and by the knowledge of their writings which he shows. He is more reserved in his attitude to the post-Reformation Anglican divines; he remarks that he "does not intend to assert that he agrees with them entirely: his agreement with them is limited by their agreement with the Primitive Church." And it is, indeed, obvious to anyone who reads the Fifth Book of the *Ecclesiastical Polity* that a marked change comes over Hooker's exposition as he passes from the superb objectivity and expansiveness of his discussion of the Incarnation and the Church to the hesitant and narrow receptionist tendency of his Eucharistic doctrine. The reasons for this cannot, however, be discussed here; it is sufficient to notice Wilberforce's frankness in recognizing it.

And what are the practical conclusions of it all? Nothing very extreme by modern standards, but then we do not live in the East Riding of Yorkshire in 1853. Wilberforce is content to urge that, where it is possible, the daily Eucharist ought to be restored (he knows of only four Anglican parishes where it is to be found), that such restoration would not be contrary to the principles of the Church of England, at least with the permission of the Bishop, and that perhaps even non-communicating attendance might be permitted. He gave the Church little opportunity to put his suggestions into practice; by the following year he had seceded, and just over two years after that he was dead. But his works remain and they deserve to be remembered. And at this time, when the future of Anglicanism is no clearer than it was in Wilberforce's day and when the official trumpet speaks with so uncertain a note, it is well for us to profit by his insistence that the standard to which the Church of England appeals is not that of the contemporary mind, nor even that of the great Anglican divines (there are Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Zwinglianism, but there is no such word as "Hookerism"), but of the authority to which those divines appeal and by which they would wish their own judgments to be corrected—the divine inspiration of Holy Scripture and its interpretation by the ancient Fathers of the undivided Church.

E. L. Mascall, O.G.S.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Dodd is Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.

The Rev. W. G. Addison is Vicar of Britford, Salisbury.

Dr Symonds is a member of the Community of the Resurrection at Mirfield.

The Rev. E. L. Mascall, O.G.S., is Lecturer in Theology at Christ Church, Oxford.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ENGLISH PSALTER. By G. D. Carleton. Mowbrays. 15s.

It is probable that a majority of Anglicans accept the use of the Psalms for the sake of certain verses and phrases suitable to personal needs but have blurred ideas why they should worship rather with the Psalter than with some collection of hymns; and the partial fog has not been blown away by the inviting efforts of a Prothero to commend this or that Psalm because Cromwell shouted it as he advanced at Dunbar, of the 1927 revisers to avoid scandal by excluding imprecation, or of some well-meaning teachers who under the influence of a purely literalist exegesis have prefaced each Psalm with a pre-Christian summary. There can be no justification for the use of the Psalter on its present scale unless by means of the Psalms the worshipper joins in unity with the Son as he praises God the Father. "That He may rightly be praised by men," wrote Augustine, "God has praised Himself; and because He has deigned to praise Himself men have learnt how to praise Him." Yet an inquiry would show many Christians unaware that the prayer book of the incarnate Christ has in Christian thought become an instrument by which the Body of Christ appropriates the intention of its eternally worshipping Head. There is a need for devotional literature upon the Psalter.

Canon Carleton's edition places the Prayer Book text of the Psalter in parallel with the important corrections of the Authorized or Revised Version (more recent suggestions are not noticed) and with lucid and crisp explanations of the literal or devotional sense where necessary; nothing irrelevant to devotional understanding is included. Each Psalm is given a heading summarizing the thought which Christians have traditionally read into it, and the work is prefaced by an excellent essay upon the Christian use of the Psalter as a whole, containing guidance upon imprecation, the pharisaism of such Psalms as 119, and general principles of interpretation.

The editor does not define the limits of allegory. Certain interpretations have been corporately approved because particular Psalms are either so understood by New Testament writers or are appointed for festivals throughout the historic Church: since Psalm 24 has universally and liturgically been referred to the Ascension, to read the Ascension into it is legitimate even though unwarranted by explicit New Testament sanction. But beyond this, allegory affords room for a variety of individual meditation; and it is questionable how far such

meditation, permissible in its place, should appear in a commentary designed to assist corporate worship—individual allegories once allowed need scarcely stop short of fanciful Patristic numerology. Canon Carleton, though restrained in his allegorical explanations, does not always discriminate between corporate interpretation and individual meditation. For example, his exegesis of the "clouds," in Ps. cxlvii, 8, as the apostles, although following a suggestion of the Eastern office, remains the product of private meditation, many other meanings being equally valid or invalid; Augustine turned the same clouds into the obscurities of Scripture. The editor wished to give examples of allegorical method; but the reader who needs a commentary on the office should be given some distinction between the corporate and the private.

This is emphatically a book for the ordinary worshipper who wishes to understand the Psalter. We do not know a better handbook for those who without expert equipment attempt to teach old or young the way of worship.

Owen Chadwick.

Wellington College.

Mother of Carmel: A Portrait of St Teresa of Jesus. By E. Allison Peers. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

Three years ago Prof. Allison Peers gave us a study of the life and works of St John of the Cross which was aptly described by one reviewer as "the best beginner's guide to St John ever written"; he has now given us a beginner's guide to St John's spiritual mother, St Teresa. The two great Spaniards supplement and balance one another and were bound together by a common spirituality (however differently expressed) and a common aim; together they reformed the Spanish Carmel of their day, between them they have enlightened the spirituality of all succeeding generations, and it is good to have studies of both from the pen of so discriminating a scholar as Prof. Peers.

The book before us is a life of its subject written from the fullness of specialized knowledge with a minimum of the apparatus commonly associated with a biography. It is a book for the unlearned, full of imagination and knowledge of humanity, as well as delicate scholarship, a book which shows us what it was like to be a contemplative, a saint, and a founder and ruler of religious houses in sixteenth-century Spain. And through it all emerges the portrait of the saint herself as she was and not as pious writers think she ought to have been. St Teresa was one of the greatest of Catholic saints, she was also one of the greatest women of European history and her greatness lives in every page of Prof. Peers' book. She was a woman with a will of iron and, like her loved St John, a "spirit of flame," but she was always womanly; and at all points we see her lovingness, her common-sense, her humour, her inconsequence. She was wholly natural because she was completely supernatural and her life shows the delicate balance and poise of the wholly surrendered soul.

Prof. Peers has, however, given us more than a portrait; his book is also an introduction to and a sensitive appreciation of her

writings. He hopes "to arouse that kind of interest in her which sends readers to her own writings," a hope which can hardly fail of success; but he does more than that, he sends us to her writings with understanding. Prof. Peers is convinced, and those who know and love her writings will agree with him, that St Teresa has a specially cogent message for our own day. She writes in her own quaintly digressive way mostly for her own nuns, but what she has to say comes home to the hearts and lives of those who seek God in the modern world. We have here no academic study in hagiography but a book of rare value to the spiritual life of our time. We look forward to the appearance of Prof. Peers' edition of the Works of the Saint in the near future.

We have referred to this book as a beginner's guide, and that it is; but it is more than that, and those who are by no means beginners, as well as all lovers of the Mother of Carmel, will find here much pleasure and enlightenment.

F. P. HARTON.

BAULKING.

THE CHRISTIAN SIGNIFICANCE OF KARL MARX. By Alexander Miller. S.C.M. Press. 6s.

This is a valuable book. It is "written primarily for Christians who are prepared to do some work on Marxism because they are convinced—whether they accept the Marxist analysis or not—that communism is a momentous fact of which Christians are bound to take account." It is to help Christians find their way about in the Marxist field. The rubbish spoken by Christians (and others) about Communism is fantastic, and worse; prejudice and ignorance among Christians, and perhaps particularly among those in ecclesiastical authority, are both disastrous and sinful. In general, the Church has been frightened of Communism or of anything that smelt of it; frightened even of making a serious study of it, and yet, as Mr Miller shows us in this book, and in his earlier *Biblical Politics*, "There is no Christian interest involved in denying either economic determinism or historical materialism." The truth or otherwise of such theory is a matter of objective scientific study, and "the man who is afraid of facts does not believe in God." Indeed, it can be claimed that scientific study by both Christians and non-Christians has in fact vindicated large tracts of the Marxist analysis of history. Without such an objective approach, neither the accuracy nor the errors are perceived, and neither can Christians and Marxists speak to one another. This book will be of the greatest help to Christians who want to do these things.

The first half is a highly compressed, yet clear, exposition of dialectical materialism as it is applied by Marxists to history and social theory. This is followed by an examination of three typical contemporary criticisms of Marxism, one by an ex-Marxist, Max Eastman, who criticizes Marxism, not for its economic determinism, but for its dogmatic Utopian theory of the classless society. A second criticism is that of Koestler, who makes the point that Marxism is not serious

about the human problems of virtue, compassion and death, and therefore cannot provide adequately for human society. The third type of criticism is that of Macmurray, who sees Marxism as the opposite materialist error to a bogus Christian otherworldliness. Another useful criticism that Mr Miller might have added is that of James Burnham's *Managerial Revolution*; he too recognizes the general scientific truth of economic determinism and the inevitability of capitalist collapse, yet hotly contests Marx's prediction of a Communist society in the sense of the classless society.

Two chapters follow on What Christianity Has to Say and What Christians Have to Do. The latter is quite excellent, including some straight talking to Christians on social responsibility. For example: "So long as Christians travel on the same trains and buses as do their unbelieving neighbours, shop at the same stores and use the same public lavatories, just so long are they inevitably bound in responsibility for the right ordering of production, transport and sanitation, etc. . . ." (p. 94). Wanting, not necessarily different things, but the right things "more passionately" will be the distinguishing mark of Christians in the political arena. Mr Miller rightly draws attention to the political and social irresponsibility of our time, especially of the young. Christians at least must accept responsibility, work with others for a just social order, and wage that social struggle to its conclusion, whether it should be by democratic process or by loyalty in a revolutionary situation, should that revolt be deemed just and necessary. This will no doubt be disliked by many Christians, but it is hard to disagree with Mr Miller unless one adopts an extreme pacifist position. Your reviewer would add the point here that the present scene of social apathy presents Christians who are armed with biblical insights and sensitive to the Marxist analysis with a special opportunity for effective impact.

The book concludes with an Epigraph on three types—the Hero, the Communist, and the Christian. How different they are, and yet how similar! All three oppose the world in their refusal to be satisfied with a shoddy, self-indulgent and acquisitive society, all are obedient to the best they know, have the same strange humility, and are prepared to suffer and die. The quotation that describes the hero describes them all: "To take your money in one hand and your life in the other . . . both hands open." The world and the Church, particularly the Church, are under judgment of these types. At this point Mr Miller could well have smitten the Christian conscience harder than he has done, laying bare our spurious spiritualism, our idealism, our priority of "worship" before obedience, our divorce of theology and life, our concern for ritual cleanliness—all of which God has denounced in the Scriptures—and through Marxism!

The writing of this book is a real service to the Church; the only general criticism is that it is not long enough to include a clear comparison, point by point, of the Marxist and the biblical analysis.

E. R. Wickham.

The Shrewsbury Hospital,
Sheffield.

Tomorrow's Teaching: The Church's New Tasks under the Education Act. By Reginald Lumb. Mowbray. 3s.

This is a much more important book than its modest size would suggest; it is above all realistic. Mr Lumb maintains that the Church must accept the new Education Act as a *fait accompli*; to reject it on the ground that its proposals make co-operation impossible is to imitate the action of the ostrich. The author is definite and constructive in indicating the opportunity presented to the Church in both controlled and aided schools, training colleges, and in the whole sphere of further education. He throws out a challenge to churchmen to reorganize Diocesan and Deanery Education Committees along much more ambitious lines; if churchmen object that this project will take years to fulfil, may they be reminded that the framers of the Education Act were not deterred because its proposals cannot be carried out overnight? There are few points to criticize adversely; there is perhaps a slight danger that the book may suggest to non-Church readers that the Church is having to make the best of a bad job—this may indeed be true, for it is not clear that we have to withdraw to the catacombs as yet. Secondly, Mr Lumb is slightly over-optimistic about the possibility of withdrawal classes in secondary schools, for in the grammar schools it is rare for two forms to have religious instruction at the same time. Thirdly, while his comments on the value of religious knowledge as a subject for the School Certificate Examination are a joy to read, he omits to refer to the opportunity for the laity with theological qualifications to become Scripture specialists in grammar schools. There are to be found the most intelligent adolescents in the country, and, in spite of the limitations imposed, this work should be undertaken by churchpeople.

M. S. Dawson.

Wrexham.

George Macdonald: Anthology. With an Introduction by C. S. Lewis. Geoffrey Bles. 5s.

These Are My Friends. By N. Brysson Morrison. Geoffrey Bles. 8s. 6d.

Mr Lewis has done us all a service in making this selection from George Macdonald's writings. Macdonald was for me, I confess, nothing more than a name; yet he proves to be in the lineal succession of English mystics which stretches from the author of *The Cloud of Unknowing* through Vaughan and Traherne and William Law down to Blake—and ends there, as I had thought, since mysticism, like poetry, becomes self-conscious and unreal after the first quarter of the nineteenth century. But no: here is a man writing things about God which turn out to be literature, and not, like Christina Rossetti and Thompson, writing literature with a religious flavour. There is neither self-consciousness nor romanticism in Macdonald. Like all genuine mystics, he is astringent and uncompromising. He restates, not interprets, the message of Jesus. He makes us see that Christ never indulged in hyperboles: with the necessary deduction from that, that

the Church of Christ is less than Christian. Jesus said that the mere possession of riches is enough to disqualify a man from gaining eternal life; a hard saying, which we tone down by murmuring the word "stewardship." He said that we should take *no* thought for the morrow —not that we should not worry unduly about the future. His teaching was revolutionary, striking at the foundations of morality and prudence. That is why they crucified Him. It has taken nearly two thousand years to whittle that teaching down to the point where it fits easily into our social system, and, regrettably, it has been the Church's function to do the whittling down. We are not surprised, therefore, to find in Macdonald a man who was forced out of his Church into isolation and poverty and an intense happiness, living in what he calls "the holy carelessness of the eternal *now*," owing allegiance to none but "the mighty Father, the cherisher of joy, the Lord of laughter."

Macdonald's greatest gift, as it appears from these selections, is his faculty for conveying the *simplicity* and the *joy* of holiness. Only too often books of devotion and instruction on the interior life repel by giving an impression of complexity and sunlessness. Inevitably, almost; for all writers on this subject are using everyday words to convey ideas and emotions inaccessible to the natural man. Love, sorrow, repentance, will, conversion; these words mean one thing in ordinary parlance, quite another in the context of the vision of God. The only solution is simplicity and a constant emphasis on the immense overwhelming joy of the religious experience. Both of these we find in Macdonald. "The working out of this our salvation must be pain," he says, "and the handing of it down to them that are below must ever be in pain; but the eternal form of the will of God in and for us, is intensity of bliss." And on simplicity: "There is a reality of being in which all things are easy and plain—oneness, that is, with the Lord of Life. . . ." But he never fails to stress the hardness of the path that leads to acceptance of this simplicity, though the path itself may be only one step from darkness to light.

Macdonald is at his best, perhaps, when writing about Nature. One is reminded forcibly of Blake and, beyond him, of the Hermetic tradition which influenced Jacob Boehme and William Law. "In what belongs to the deeper meanings of nature and her mediation between us and God, the appearances of nature are the truths of nature, far deeper than any scientific discoveries in and concerning them." This is plainly the doctrine of Boehme's *Signatura Rerum* and of Lanza del Vasto's *Chiffre des Choses*, and sums up the whole opposition of the poets and mystics to the Bacon-Newton synthesis. It is what the living creatures have to say to the childlike soul, Macdonald tells us, that is the most significant thing about them. Revelation dwells in the exterior form: it is *that* of which we are challenged to decipher the meaning. I wish there were space to say more about Macdonald's view of Nature, and his splendid insight into childhood; but perhaps enough has been said to send many readers to the wisdom which this little book of selections contains.

Miss Brysson Morrison's *These Are My Friends* is an attempt to retell the Gospel story from the viewpoint of each of the twelve disciples. Of

these 240 pages of neutral verse the best that can be said is that the original phrases of our Lord fit in without a sense of incongruity; but Miss Morrison has no talent for characterization—not one of her disciples comes to life or remains in the memory; and when she attempts the dramatic touch she can be positively offensive. On the raising of Lazarus, for instance:

> And when they said, "Master, come and see," His face
> Opened like a mouth and He wept.

There is too much of this sort of thing. But for those who like to view the old narrative from a new angle Miss Morrison's poem will have its value.

Bernard Blackstone.

University College,
Swansea.

SHORTER NOTICES

The Shattered Cross. By William Robinson. The Berean Press. 2s. 6d.

This little book represents an attempt to give an objective account of the various communions of Christendom together with some reference to more unorthodox and doubtful bodies such as Christian Science. Such an attempt is hardly likely to succeed, and in any case such a summarized account of the theory and practice of religious bodies is bound to be too sketchy to be of much value, but Principal Robinson, who belongs to a not very familiar sect, the "Churches of Christ" (Disciples) is well equipped for the task, having both learning and charity. The body to which he belongs came into existence to work for greater unity, and it has preserved much that other sects have abandoned or forgotten.

A consideration of his book leads one to the conviction that only in the rediscovery of the Eucharist as the central act of worship can we hope for a reunited Christendom and that the difference between the communions often has as much a social or historical, even political origin as a credal. A new age of transition and revolution may heal old wounds or throw up new sects.

This small book may not be of great importance but it does reveal its author as a helpful and well-informed mediator who must surely be a most useful member of the Council of the Churches.

Leonard M. Schiff.

Spennymoor.

Trust or Perish. By John Middleton Murry. Dakers. 1s.

Britain, says Mr Murry, must speedily declare that "it will on no account participate in another World War." To treat this as just the bee in the pacifist's bonnet would, in the dreadful light of Hiroshima, be frivolity of a very macabre sort. Virtue flows from men and nations which have become obedient to Necessity. By our perfect and peculiar vulnerability to atomic attack, Necessity decrees that we've had our history, if history is to be persistently construed in terms of arma-

mented majesty and domination. By the fact that we are committed to a tremendous job of democratic, socialist construction, calling for all the man-power we've got, Necessity mocks at the notion of maintaining an armed force of even 750,000. Necessity proposes that Britain has now no option but to save the world by its example. Such a declaration as Mr Murry calls for would be the minimal evidence that we are aware of our destiny, and of the world's most desperate need. The world is heading for calamity because destructive power has increased a thousandfold this past hundred years, and quite incalculably more by atomic fission; because the power now belongs not to individual but to collective man, who, therefore, is inexorably driven to totalitarianism; because, finally, there is as yet no sign that the nation-states are anything like ready to substitute for the anarchy which reigns over and bedevils all their relations, a Law respect for which would demonstrate that totalitarianism is no longer a condition of survival. Practically speaking, this means that Russia must quickly be convinced of the fact that her partners in the Big Three are not plotting her annihilation. She will not be convinced unless one of the other Two demonstrates the fact in adventurous action. It would be optimistic to expect the gesture from America. It's up to us to take the moral leadership of the world.

I accept Mr Murry's analysis. But it terrifies me. For it would seem to follow that none other than the Church must confront the country with its vocation, and let the nation see its destiny in fellowships of the redeemed who, having passed from fear to generosity, have found a spiritual power commensurate with the atom bomb and all the technical paraphernalia of totalitarianism.

W. A. Smellie.

Perth.

I Send You Forth. By Margaret Cropper. S.P.C.K. and National Society. 1s. 6d.

This is an admirable play for a study group of young people on the look-out for something to act. The meaning is clear, staging easy, and there is "something in it." Five young people meet after a talk with a padre to discuss the problem "How can we spread the news of Jesus in our day?" Answers to the problems raised are given in short scenes from the lives of Christians through the ages. Two of the Seventy are simple fisherfolk, yet in the power of Jesus heal the blind girl. The distress of this people guides King Oswald where the hope and love of Christ is most needed. The dullwitted ploughman and Lady of the Court of Charles II are chosen each in their different spheres to be effective disciples of Jesus. Finally two factory girls, by contrast of their own happy purposeful lives, make others feel their own emptiness and boredom and seek to find out what it is they have which the others lack. Apart from its suitability for very amateur acting by some specifically religious group, I think this play is a little too obvious, even trite, to stand reading on its own. Simplicity is good, but if it is at the expense of profundity I confess I don't see the point.

Mary Jackson.

Oxford.

CORRESPONDENCE

LUKE VII, 47

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

The words at the beginning of Mr Dammers's note on Luke vii, 36-50 in the March number of THEOLOGY lead me to ask if we are necessarily confronted with "an illogical attempt to reconcile" two distinct points—viz., the teaching that a repentant sinner who was full of love was forgiven much, and the teaching that he to whom much is forgiven will love much.

There is no doubt that the first half of verse 47, as it stands, does not follow logically on what precedes, and further that the first part of the verse as it stands does not accord with the second part.

But I have for a long time felt (see a note of mine in *Expository Times*, August, 1926) that the *non sequitur* is due to a very early failure to understand οὗ χάριν, and a consequent adjustment of the order of the words in the Greek text to fit this failure.

If we understand οὗ χάριν not as "wherefore" but as "because," the logic within verse 47 is preserved, and the sense of verse 47 needs no reconciling with what precedes. λέγω σοι, which to suit the misunderstood οὗ χάριν has been brought forward from its proper place in front of ὅτι (which now means "that" and not "because") must be carried back to its original place. Verse 47 would then read: "Because her sins which are many are forgiven, I say unto thee that she loved much: but to whomsoever little is forgiven, the same loveth little." The logic of the reconstructed verse has been preserved in the lines of a well-known hymn:

> Like Mary's gift, let my devotion prove,
> Forgiven greatly, how I greatly love.

There is authority from the papyri for οὗ χάριν for χάριν οὗ as "because," *cf.* Luke iv, 18, οὗ εἵνεκεν from LXX, just as there is New Testament authority for ἀνθ' ὧν as "because" (Acts xii, 43). See Moulton-Milligan, Part VIII., p. 684. The word we should expect for "wherefore" is διό. But οὗ χάριν suggests "in return for the fact that her sins, etc."

JOHN ARMAGH:

BAPTISM AND CONFIRMATION

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

In the Rev. G. Burningham's letter published in your April number, occurs the phrase: "The primitive practice of baptizing adults only."

This kind of statement is not infrequent in articles on baptism, but I myself should very much like to know on what actual evidence it is based. The reluctance of some to be baptized till they were near

death for fear of relapsing into sin may be regarded as such evidence, but was this reluctance really primitive?

I think it is dangerous to draw conclusions from the modern mission field. Writers not in close contact with that field are apt to assume that in it adult baptism is the rule. This is far from true, since when a family accepts (through its head) the Christian faith, the children are baptized at the same time as the parents, except of course by Baptist missionaries. Is it not probable that Jewish converts, accustomed to the admission of their boys to the sacred community in infancy by the sacramental rite of circumcision, would expect the rule to hold in the Christian Church? Is it not so probable that the onus of proof rests on those who deny the existence of infant baptism in the early Church? Moreover, to the modern missionary it seems obvious that such baptisms as those of Cornelius and his family, and of the Philippian jailer and his, included the children if there were any. I write from the standpoint of a missionary with a good many years' experience in India.

I am,
Yours faithfully,
W. MACHIN.

MISSIONARY GUEST HOUSES,
SELLY OAK,
BIRMINGHAM.
April 1, 1946.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

In connexion with the discussion on baptism and confirmation may I be permitted to add this contribution?

It is the nature of Sacraments that they are "the point of intersection of the timeless with time." When the Church acts sacramentally, that is according to her function as the extension of the Incarnation in time, her action participates in the single saving action of the Incarnate Word. It is one with that eternal present in which His life enters ours to redeem it. Therefore we must believe that, although for practical purposes (since we are still bound by time) we are obliged to distinguish the Sacraments one from another, their fundamental nature is not divisible. All those moments in which our time is drawn into eternity are one moment.

In this eternal moment our human life is taken up into the operation of the Trinity. It is in an incomprehensible mystery at the meeting-place of Christ and His Spirit, the ascending and descending love. Charles Williams, in the opening passage of his study of the Holy Spirit in the Church, so declares it when he writes of the beginning of Christendom as "the meeting place between two heavenward lines, one drawn from Bethany along the Ascent of Messias, the other from Jerusalem against the Descent of the Paraclete."

To divide this reciprocal act, to which in the Sacraments we cling for our salvation, is an unthinkable impossibility. The Word of God cannot be without His Spirit. He is Himself the invocation of the Spirit as the Spirit is the begetting of the Word. So we cannot be in-

corporated into Christ without receiving the gift of the Holy Ghost. We cannot be baptized without receiving this gift and we cannot be confirmed without a renewal of our baptism.

None of this is to deny that confirmation should remain a separate rite. We live in time and we must continually, not once only at the beginning of our lives, renew ourselves in the living waters of eternity. But we must remain clear that the Sacraments are one and indivisible. Every sacrament is *incorporation*. Every sacrament is *invocation*. That is their very nature. In them creation is drawn up in Christ by the power of the Spirit to the Father.

Yours faithfully,
L. LANG-SIMS.

34A BURGATE STREET,
CANTERBURY.
April 7, 1946.

SONS OR SERVANTS?

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

I am grateful to Miss Westlake for pointing out, in her letter in the April number of THEOLOGY, that sonship and service are not necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive conceptions. Much of what she has to say is indeed a valid expansion of my article. A careful reading of it, however, would scarcely justify the comment that "through treating this parable in isolation and concentrating on detail" I have "shifted the emphasis from the behaviour of the father to the supposed sin of the sons." I beg leave to deal with this astounding statement.

(1) A parable must be allowed to tell its own tale. The discussion of lexical and semasiological details does not alter the "form" of the parable. Miss Westlake speaks of "the parable of the elder son" having affinities with the Labourers in the Vineyard. I presume she is referring to my comment in that regard. But who has heard of the parable of the elder son? There is one parable—that of the father and two sons. And the unity of form of that parable is one which demands a contrast of the kind I suggested—between sons and *servants*. This is not the same thing as suggesting an opposition, or disjunction of an exhaustive kind, between sonship and *service*.

(2) Naturally, I am not unaware of the parables which refer to servants. But each parable must be allowed its own hearing. Miss Westlake apparently prefers to divide Luke xv. 11 ff. into two loosely connected sections, the meaning of the first half (the Prodigal) being "the same as in the two parables that precede," while the parable of the elder son "has affinities with the Labourers in the Vineyard." I must insist that, far from "concentrating on detail," the interpretation I suggest is an interpretation which fits the whole parable, without dissolving away the minor affinities referred to above. The position of the parable in Luke xv is understandable enough in the light of critical investigation of Luke's methods—but that does not mean that the context must control its meaning.

(3) It remains to point out that the contrast "Sons or Servants"

does not "shift the emphasis from the Father to the supposed sin of the sons." Much the other way. A son implies a father. Servants, of any kind, do not. The Father is indeed the commanding figure in the parable, but nothing in the article in question suggests anything else. Precisely because the elder son fails to be a son, precisely because the Prodigal asks to be a *misthios*, we learn of the father's character. Lastly, why is the sin of the sons to be referred to as "supposed"? Their sin lay in their false conception of sonship and fatherhood. Of the two, the elder son is in the more dangerous condition. Their behaviour may have been natural enough—but it was nevertheless sinful, in its lack of that spirit of adoption whereby we cry "Abba, Father"—not Abbana, with its formal sterility.

Yours, etc.
JOHN E. YATES.

ST MICHAEL'S VICARAGE,
LAWTON MOOR,
NORTHENDEN,
MANCHESTER.
April 12th, 1946.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

A.P.C.K.: W. B. Stanford, *Faith and Faction in Ireland Now* (1s.).
THE AUTHOR: Clement Tiger, *Papist Pie* (2s. 6d.).
BLACKFRIARS: G. Jansen, O.P., *Money is Sterile* (1s.).
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: F. Hildebrandt, *Melanchthon Alien or Ally?* (8s. 6d.).
CHANNEL PUBLISHERS: P. W. Petter, *Archiepiscopal Diagnosis* (1s.).
JAMES CLARKE: H. Cunliffe-Jones, *The Authority of the Biblical Revelation* (7s. 6d.).
CLOISTER PRESS (U.S.A.): Eric Montizambert, *Christianity in Crisis* ($2.00).
DACRE PRESS: L. S. Thornton, C.R., *Confirmation To-day* (6d.).
DENT: R. V. G. Tasker (Ed.), *St Augustine's City of God* (3s.).
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS: Sirarpie der Nersessian, *Armenia and the Byzantine Empire* (16s. 6d.).
KING'S CROWN PRESS: J. R. Martin, *Empirical Philosophies of Religion* (13s. 6d.).
LONGMANS: W. C. Somerville, *A First Introduction to the New Testament* (2s. 6d.); Lucy Menzies (Ed.), *Collected Papers of Evelyn Underhill* (6s.).
LUTTERWORTH PRESS: G. O. Griffith, *Interpreters of Reality* (5s.).
MOWBRAY: W. H. Elliot, *My Scallop Shell* (5s.).
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: M. H. Carré, *Realists and Nominalists* (8s. 6d.).
S.C.M. PRESS: R. V. G. Tasker, *The Old Testament in the New Testament* (6s.).
SHEED AND WARD: Raymond Preston, *Four Quartets Rehearsed* (5s.).
S.P.C.K.: A. Winter, C. R., *The Shield of Faith* (5s.); S. Bolshakoff, *The Doctrine of the Unity of the Church* (18s.); R. F. Palmer, S.S.J.E., *Let Us Pray* (1s. 6d.); T. W. Crafer (Ed.), *The Priest's Vade Mecum* (3s. 6d.); G. Seaver, *The Magnet of the Cross* (1s.); C. J. Grimes, *Towards an Indian Church* (15s.); A. Elliott-Canon, *Three Minute Epilogues* (1s.); D. W. T. Shropshire, *Primitive Marriage and European Law* (12s. 6d.); D. E. Taylor, *Youth Fellowship Work* (2s.); H. M. Waddams, *The Swedish Church* (6s.).
TYNDALE PRESS: R. E. D. Clark, *Creation* (2s.).

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher